SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

DBSYSTEM :EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2392 -1 REV:11/04/87

ASSEMBLY :AFT PCA-4, 5,& 6

CRIT. FUNC: 1R

P/N RI :JANTX1N1204RA CRIT. HDW:

P/N VENDOR: QUANTITY

VEHICLE 10Z 103 104

:THREE

EFFECTIVITY: Х Х Х PHASE(S): PL X LO X OO DO

:1 PER PREVALVE 1, 2,& 3

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-FAIL C-PASS

PREPARED BY:

APPROYED DES

APPROVED BY (NASA): EPDC 5SM Or a Jan

DES

J BROWN

Melinia CL Hore

MPS SSM

REL

F DEFENSOR REL

EPDC RELICIONALINE FOR

MPS REL

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D MASAI

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ITEM:

DIODE, BLOCKING (12 AMP), LHZ PREVALVE 1, 2, & 3, OPEN COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT.

FUNCTION:

USED TO ISOLATE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER TO A COMMON OPEN SOLENOID. LOCATED AT RPC OUTPUT AHEAD OF OPEN COMMAND A HDC III. 54V76A134A4CR26, 55V76A135A4CR26, 56V76A136A4CR26.

FAILURE MODE:

OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT POWER.

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
- (A) LOSS OF ONE OF TWO (OPEN COMMAND A) POWER PATHS TO OPEN SOLENOID.
- (B,C,D) NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE.
- (E) POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER THIRD FAILURE (SECOND FAILURE -LOSS OF SECOND POWER PATH TO OPEN SOLENOID, BISTABLE FEATURE WILL MAINTAIN LH2 PREVALVE IN OPEN POSITION. THIRD FAILURE - PREMATURE ACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID) RESULTING IN PREMATURE LH2 PREVALVE CLOSURE WHILE ENGINE IS RUNNING. UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE DUE TO STARVATION CUTOFF. FAILS B SCREEN BECAUSE REDUNDANT POWER PATH MASKS FAILURE. NOTE - BISTABLE FEATURE NOT DEMONSTRATED BY TEST (CERTIFIED BY ANALYSIS). A FULL FLOW DETENT VERIFICATION TEST IS SCHEDULED FOR GFY 1988.

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DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
- (A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE
 REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 DIODE, POWER-STUD MOUNTED.
- (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 MDM COMMAND REDUNDANCY TEST, V41AEO.180B, 200B, 220B EVERY FLIGHT.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.